Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy

Theme-based Issue of Methode

Volume IV, Number 6 – November 2015

Editor:

Guglielmo Feis (Università degli Studi di Milano)

The deadline for sending a contribution:

September 1, 2015

Philosophy and ontology of action are two important tools in the analysis of legal problems. Both philosophers and legal scholars have stressed this point, but a shared framework is still missing. Michael Moore’s Act and Crime (1993) and Causation and Responsibility (2009) as well as Gideon Yaffe’s Attempts (2010) are notable exceptions to construct such a framework. In particular the issue of attempts – i.e. failed efforts to complete a crime – provided an interesting domain of problems for different backgrounds to interact. The complexities of cases of attempts crimes gave philosophers thick examples upon with they should test their more refined theory of intentional actions, responsibility and trying; legal scholars, on the other hand, had reasons to go deeper in refining their notion of belief, intent and agency. This issue of Methode – Analytic Perspectives aims at dissecting the ways philosophy can help us in clarifying some of the problems arising with attempts and other legal matters such as: – What are the relationships between attempting, believing, intending and trying in the legal domain? – Does legal agency carry over a different and peculiar philosophy and ontology of action? – How are action and agency framed in the legal domain? – What is the role of luck in attempts? Is there a logic for attempts? Why sanctioning attempts? – What is the role of the Ought Implies Can principle in the legal domain (in particular in the case of attempts and tryings)? The issue shall feature a discussion among invited contributors: each invited paper will be commented and then there will be the author’s reply.

For more information visit the website:
http://www.methode.unito.it/methOJS/index.php/meth/pages/view/callforpapers